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INTRODUCTION
The Federal Rules of Evidence (FRE) and the case law in-
terpreting them attempt to strike a balance between truth seek-
ing and procedural protections for criminal defendants. The in-
teraction between Rules 611(b) and 104(d) embodies this
tension. Rule 611(b) is the general rule on cross-examination. It
provides that "[c]ross-examination should not go beyond the sub-
ject matter of the direct examination and matters affecting the
witness's credibility," but the rule also permits courts to "allow
inquiry into additional matters as if on direct examination."'
This reflects the Advisory Committee's preference for "wide-
open" cross-examination unconstrained by procedural rules
strictly limiting it to the scope of the direct.2 Rule 104(d),
however, is meant to counterbalance Rule 611(b)'s breadth in
t BA 2013, Columbia University; JD Candidate 2018, The University of Chicago
Law School.
1 FRE 611(b).
2 See FRE 611, Advisory Committee Note to Subdivision (b). The Supreme Court
has sanctioned the practice of relying on the Advisory Committee Notes as a "useful
guide" in interpreting the FRE. In Tome v United States, 513 US 150 (1995), Justice
Anthony Kennedy wrote for the majority that, "[w]here . . . 'Congress did not amend the
Advisory Committee's draft in any way . . . the Committee's commentary is particularly
relevant in determining the meaning of the document Congress enacted."' Id at 160,
quoting Beech Aircraft Corp v Rainey, 488 US 153, 165 n 9 (1988). The Court's analysis
in Tome relied heavily on the Notes to derive the "purpose" behind Rule 801(d)(1)(B), the
rule at issue in that case. See Tome, 513 US at 160-61. It is true that the Court is not
unanimous in its adherence to the Advisory Committee Notes-Justice Antonin Scalia
believed that "they bear no special authoritativeness as the work of the draftsmen." Id at
167 (Scalia concurring). But even Scalia regarded them as persuasive authority-
"ordinarily the most persuasive"-concerning the meaning of the Rules. Id (Scalia con-
curring). See also generally Eileen A. Scallen, Interpreting the Federal Rules of Evidence:
The Use and Abuse of the Advisory Committee Notes, 28 Loyola LA L Rev 1283 (1995)
(discussing the Tome opinions and concluding that the objections to the use of traditional
types of legislative history in interpreting legal texts do not apply to the Advisory Com-
mittee Notes).
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the context of criminal preliminary hearings.3 Matters decided
at such hearings include, but are not limited to, the admissibil-
ity of evidence,4 the admissibility of a confession,5 and bail.6
Rule 104(d) provides that, by "testifying on a preliminary ques-
tion, a defendant in a criminal case does not become subject to
cross-examination on other issues in the case."7 This additional
procedural protection is meant to encourage defendants' partici-
pation in the determination of preliminary matters 8 and is espe-
cially important in light of the legal burdens that attach to and
disincentivize defendant testimony.9
While Rule 104(d) is designed to limit cross-examination of
criminal defendants at preliminary hearings and to provide
them with procedural protection from overly broad exposure on
cross, it has not always been interpreted and applied this way by
courts. The language of the rule is vague-nowhere do the FRE
define what is meant by "preliminary question"-and the four-
sentence Advisory Committee Note does little to illuminate the
rule's intended scope. Courts have ranged from narrow to broad
interpretations of the rule's language. The broader a court's in-
terpretation of "preliminary question," the less it protects de-
fendants from questioning about "other issues" in the case on
cross-examination and, consequently, the more likely it is to dis-
courage a defendant from testifying.
As a general matter, courts treat a "preliminary question"
either as coterminous with the scope of the preliminary hearing
3 See FRE 104, Advisory Committee Note to Subdivision (d) ("The provision is nec-
essary because of the breadth of cross-examination under Rule 611(b).").
4 See, for example, Simmons v United States, 390 US 377, 381 (1968); United
States v Gomez-Diaz, 712 F2d 949, 950 (5th Cir 1983).
5 See, for example, Wright v State, 9 A2d 253, 255 (Md 1939); United States v
Roberts, 14 F3d 502, 509 (10th Cir 1993).
6 See, for example, Exparte Homan, 963 SW2d 543, 543 (Tex App 1996).
7 FRE 104(d).
8 FRE 104, Advisory Committee Note to Subdivision (d).
9 For a discussion of ways in which the criminal justice system discourages de-
fendants from testifying, see Alexandra Natapoff, Speechless: The Silencing of Criminal
Defendants, 80 NYU L Rev 1449, 1457-62 (2005) (describing "the pervasive fact of si-
lence in the criminal justice system and how the everyday procedures and practices of
litigation consistently ensure that defendants say little or nothing"); Jeffrey Bellin, Im-
proving the Reliability of Criminal Trials through Legal Rules That Encourage Defend-
ants to Testify, 76 U Cin L Rev 851, 863 (2008) (noting that harsher burdens have been
placed on the right to testify than on the right to remain silent); Ted Sampsell-Jones,
Making Defendants Speak, 93 Minn L Rev 1327, 1328 (2009) (noting that "[tihe prosecu-
tor's ability to cross-examine a defendant chills the latter's right to testify" and conclud-
ing that "[tlhe legal system punishes defendants too much for taking the stand, and re-
wards defendants too much for remaining silent").
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itself or as requiring some degree of parsing the hearing into
constituent issues. The first approach protects defendants from
cross-examination into "other issues in the case" as required un-
der Rule 104(d) by importing the "scope-of-the-direct" limitation
from Rule 611(b) but without its allowance for "inquiry into ad-
ditional matters as if on direct." This in effect applies the first
sentence of Rule 611(b) to the preliminary hearing context. The
problem with this reading, however, is that its conflation of
Rules 611(b) and 104(d) is contrary to the Advisory Committee's
intention that cross-examination on preliminary questions be
narrower than general cross-examination. As a result, it leaves
Rule 104(d) with very little teeth in protecting criminal defendants.
The second approach breaks down the hearing issue into
component parts. While courts have been reluctant to interpret
"preliminary question" as the smallest constituent unit of the
matter at issue,10 they have generally defined it as narrower
than the scope of the hearing." For example, in the suppression
context, instead of treating the admissibility of a particular
piece of evidence as a single preliminary question, courts follow-
ing this approach might treat each of the defendant's claims (for
example, lack of a search warrant, lack of consent to a search,
and lack of probable cause) or each individual legal question (for
example, was there a warrant, or did a warrant exception ap-
ply?) as a separate preliminary question. This would allow the
court to limit cross-examination to whether there was lack of
consent, if that were the determinative question, and disallow
cross on other issues implicated by the hearing. Such narrower
interpretations of "preliminary question" thus provide criminal
defendants with greater protection by decreasing the exposure
they face in choosing to testify. Regardless of a court's interpre-
tation of "preliminary question," however, defendants face an-
other hurdle in the form of the Rule 104(d) impeachment
exception, which allows cross-examination to attack credibility
10 See, for example, Gomez-Diaz, 712 F2d at 951-52 (refusing to define "prelimi-
nary question" as the single yes-or-no question whether the defendant signed an x-ray
consent form, treating the defendant's consent more generally as the preliminary ques-
tion at issue).
11 See, for example, Wright, 9 A2d at 255 (defining voluntariness as a preliminary
question in deciding the admissibility of a confession); Homan, 963 SW2d at 544 (treat-
ing the defendant's ability to make bail as a preliminary question and precluding cross-
examination regarding other bail factors).
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beyond what would otherwise be permissible under
Rule 104(d).12
Given the importance of preliminary matters in the resolu-
tion of a defendant's case and the fact that the defendant him-
self is often the person who "above all others may be in a posi-
tion to meet the prosecution's case,"13 clarity on the protection
Rule 104(d) actually provides is extremely important. This is es-
pecially true because the very uncertainty of the legal rule can
discourage defendants from testifying,14 contrary to the purpose
of the rule. For this reason, this Comment provides a framework
for guiding trial judges' discretion to preserve the integrity of
the text and purpose of the rule.
This Comment, which proceeds in three parts, argues for a
more protective reading of Rule 104(d). Part I introduces
Rules 104(d) and 611(b) and discusses the seminal Supreme
Court cases that inspired the rules in their present form.1
Part II examines current differences among courts in interpret-
ing the scope of preliminary-question cross-examination under
Rule 104(d). Finally, Part III performs a close textual analysis of
Rule 104(d) in the context of the FRE more generally and pro-
poses three approaches for ensuring that the rule achieves its
purpose. First, it suggests outer limits to Rule 104(d) cross-
examination. Second, it suggests limiting the impeachment ex-
ception to attacks on credibility that are within the scope of the
preliminary matter. Finally, it encourages judges to make pre-
liminary rulings regarding the scope of cross-examination before
a defendant decides whether to take the stand. Taken individu-
ally, these changes are modest, require no amendment to the
FRE, and would not upset the current framework the Rules
have established. Nonetheless, in combination, outer limits, lim-
ited impeachment, and preliminary rulings tackle the different
factors that currently disincentivize defendant participation-
overly broad interpretations of "preliminary question," an ex-
pansive impeachment exception, and uncertainty as to how a
judge will rule-and provide greater predictability for criminal
12 While an impeachment exception to Rule 104(d) is universally accepted, see
Part I.B.2, the scope of the exception is not well defined.
13 Bellin, 76 U Cin L Rev at 854 (cited in note 9), quoting Ferguson v Georgia, 365
US 570, 582 (1961).
14 See Simmons, 390 US at 392 ("[A] defendant who knows that his testimony may
be admissible against him at trial will sometimes be deterred from presenting the testi-
monial proof . .. necessary .... ).
15 See generally Johnson v United States, 318 US 189 (1943); Simmons, 390 US 377.
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defendants while safeguarding the truth-seeking function of the
trial process.
I. BACKGROUND AND HISTORICAL FOUNDATIONS OF RULE 104(D)
Rules 104(d) and 611(b) together govern the scope of cross-
examination in criminal cases-Rule 104(d) in the preliminary
hearing context and Rule 611(b) at trial. Rule 104(d) states that
"[b]y testifying on a preliminary question, a defendant in a crim-
inal case does not become subject to cross-examination on other
issues in the case."16 The rule can be understood only in parallel
to Rule 611(b), however, as the Advisory Committee explicitly
defines the rules in relation to each other, describing Rule 104(d)
as "necessary because of the breadth of cross-examination under
Rule 611(b)."17 Rule 611(b), in turn, provides that "[c]ross-
examination should not go beyond the subject matter of the di-
rect examination and matters affecting the witness's credibility,"
but "[t]he court may allow inquiry into additional matters as if
on direct examination."18 The first sentence of Rule 611(b), also
known as the "scope-of-the-direct" requirement, is its general
governing provision. The Advisory Committee notes that "[t]he
provision of the second sentence . . . is designed for those situa-
tions in which the result otherwise would be confusion, compli-
cation, or protraction of the case."19 Thus, in light of the Advisory
Committee's intent that Rule 104(d) act as a counterweight to
the breadth of Rule 611(b) at preliminary hearings, Rule 104(d)
cross-examination should not exceed that which would be per-
mitted under the first sentence of Rule 611(b). Given the two
rules' interdependent relationship, it is crucial to understand
how both evolved and function in practice.
This Part proceeds by looking at the landmark cases that
inspired the rules in their current form: the relevancy test of
Johnson v United States,20 which is the foundation of today's
Rule 611(b), and the constitutional doctrine of Simmons v
United States,21 which inspired Rule 104(d). By looking at the
historical roots of Rules 611(b) and 104(d), it is possible to flesh
out the substance of the rules and their underlying policy goals,
16 FRE 104(d).
17 FRE 104, Advisory Committee Note to Subdivision (d).
18 FRE 611(b).
19 FRE 611, Advisory Committee Note to Subdivision (b).
20 318 US 189 (1943).
21 390 US 377 (1968).
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illuminating the Advisory Committee's intent upon codification
of the common-law rules in 1975.
A. Cross-Examination before and after the Federal Rules
The Supreme Court has referred to cross-examination as the
"greatest legal engine ever invented for the discovery of truth"22
and stated that "[t]here are few subjects, perhaps, upon which
this Court and other courts have been more nearly unanimous
than in their expressions of belief that the right of . . . cross-
examination is an essential and fundamental requirement for
the kind of fair trial which is this country's constitutional goal."23
For this reason, cross-examination has been lauded and protect-
ed, especially in the context of the Sixth Amendment's
Confrontation Clause, which protects a defendant's right to
cross-examine adverse witnesses.24 Thus, given cross-
examination's status as an important truth-seeking tool, courts
have historically imposed few limits on parties' ability to cross-
examine witnesses, including criminal defendants.25
1. The traditional approach to cross-examination: the
relevancy test.
The traditional view of cross-examination is illustrated in
Johnson. The defendant in the case, Enoch L. "Nucky" Johnson
(the inspiration for the character "Nucky Thompson" in the HBO
TV series Boardwalk Empire26), was an Atlantic City politician
from the 1910s until his conviction for tax evasion in 1941.27
Serving as county treasurer, Johnson became the "political boss"
of Prohibition-era Atlantic City, protecting those who engaged in
22 California v Green, 399 US 149, 158 (1970).
23 Pointer v Texas, 380 US 400, 405 (1965).
24 US Const Amend VI ("In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the
right ... to be confronted with the witnesses against him.").
25 See Portuondo v Agard, 529 US 61, 69 (2000) ("[W]hen [a criminal defendant]
assumes the role of a witness, the rules that generally apply to other witnesses-rules
that serve the truth-seeking function of the trial-are generally applicable to him as
well."), quoting Perry v Leeke, 488 US 272, 282 (1989).
26 See Boardwalk Empire (HBO 2010). See also Dustin Rowles, How Similar Is
Nucky Thompson from Boardwalk Empire' to the Real-Life Nucky Johnson? (Uproxx,
Sept 6, 2013), archived at http://perma.cc/LMD9-WR9G; Boardwalk Empire (IMDb), ar-
chived at http://perma.cc/GA52-ZRG6.
27 See Enoch "Nucky" Johnson (Mob Museum), archived at http://perma.cc/77P2
-SG7U.
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bootlegging, gambling, and prostitution.28 He lived lavishly, his
income coming from "the percentage he took on each gallon of il-
legal liquor and on the income of each gambling establishment
and house of prostitution in Atlantic City."29 Johnson famously
did not apologize for delivering illegal products to paying cus-
tomers,30 and his public persona attracted federal attention. He
was indicted in 1939 and tried on charges of evading taxes on
$125,000 received from illegal lottery operators in 1935, 1936,
and 1937.31
At his trial, Johnson took the stand and, on direct examina-
tion, admitted that he had received weekly payments from the
lottery syndicate up to November 1937. On cross-examination,
Johnson denied receiving any payments from the syndicate dur-
ing November and December 1937.32 The prosecution then asked
Johnson whether he had received any money from the syndicate
in 1938.33 Defense counsel objected to the question on the ground
that it was not relevant to Johnson's activity in the years in
question and would tend to prove a different offense from the
one charged in the indictment (namely that Johnson had also
committed tax violations in 1938). Nevertheless, the district
court overruled the objection, and Johnson answered that he
had.34 The prosecution then asked who had given him the mon-
ey, and the defense objected again.35
In a sidebar discussion outside the hearing of the defendant
and the jury, the prosecution and defense argued over the ap-
propriate scope of cross-examination. The prosecutor maintained
that the questions asked in cross-examination were proper to es-
tablish a continuous practice of receiving lottery income
throughout 1937, while the defense insisted that cross-
examination should be limited to the subjects opened up by the
direct examination.36 The trial judge ruled that the cross-
examination was permissible because it bore directly on credibil-
ity.37 When cross-examination resumed, Johnson asserted his
28 See Enoch L. Johnson, Ex-Boss in Jersey: Prohibition-Era Ruler of Atlantic City,
85, Dies (NY Times, Dec 10, 1968), archived at http://perma.cc/BUB6-K4VQ.
29 Id.
30 Id.
31 Id.
32 Johnson, 318 US at 191.
33 Id.
34 Id.
35 Id.
36 Johnson, 318 US at 192.
37 Id.
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Fifth Amendment right against self-incrimination.38 In closing
arguments, the prosecutor argued at length that Johnson's claim
of privilege amounted to an admission of income tax violations
in 1938, which in turn implied that Johnson had lied about not
receiving money from the syndicate in the last two months of
1937.39 Johnson was convicted of tax evasion for 1936 and 1937,40
and the Third Circuit affirmed his convictions.41
The Supreme Court also affirmed Johnson's convictions,
holding that the cross-examination was proper because
Johnson's "voluntary offer of testimony upon any fact is a waiver
as to all other relevant facts, because of the necessary connec-
tion between all."42 The Court's sole inquiry in determining the
appropriateness of the cross-examination questions was whether
they were relevant.43 Because the amount and source of the 1938
income might support a finding that the payments were not in-
terrupted during the last two months of 1937, they were rele-
vant, and the Court concluded that the questioning was there-
fore proper.44 While the Third Circuit had decided the matter on
the theory that the testimony went to Johnson's credibility,45 the
Supreme Court rejected this reasoning in favor of the relevancy
test.46
The Supreme Court's departure from the lower court's rea-
soning was significant. The relevancy test that the Court ex-
pounded reflects a much broader and more inclusive view of
cross-examination than the impeachment rationale relied on by
the Third Circuit. While impeachment remains a valid use of
cross-examination under the FRE, even when it is beyond the
38 Id at 192-93.
39 Id at 193-94.
40 Johnson, 318 US at 190. He was acquitted of the 1935 charge. Id.
41 Id at 195, citing United States v Johnson, 129 F2d 954 (3d Cir 1942).
42 Johnson, 318 US at 195 (emphasis omitted).
43 Id. Under the FRE, evidence is "relevant" if: "(a) it has any tendency to make a
fact more or less probable than it would be without the evidence; and (b) the fact is of
consequence in determining the action." FRE 401.
44 Johnson, 318 US at 195-96.
45 Johnson, 129 F2d at 960-61 ('These questions properly were designed to test the
credibility of the defendant's original statement that he did not receive money from the
numbers backers in the last two months of 1937.").
46 Johnson, 318 US at 196 ("That line of inquiry therefore satisfied the test of rele-
vancy and was a proper part of cross-examination. Though the issue might have been
more aptly phrased by the court in terms other than credibility, the meaning of the rul-
ing in its context is plain.") (citations omitted).
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scope of the direct47 (and even under Rule 104(d)),48 it is narrow-
ly limited: impeachment cross-examination is permissible only
when, and only to the extent that, it is used to undermine the
defendant's credibility in a way consistent with the FRE.49 The
relevancy test, on the other hand, is the default rule and repre-
sents a vision of wide-open cross-examination unconstrained by
procedural limitations-for which anything that has any ten-
dency to make a material fact more or less likely is relevant and
therefore a proper subject of cross. Because the Johnson decision
reflects a view that virtually any line of inquiry meets this
lenient standard, it limits criminal defendants' procedural pro-
tections on cross-examination to the rule against inquiry into
collateral crimes unconnected with the charged offense.so
2. Cross-examination today: Rule 611(b) and its limits.
While cross-examination under today's Rule 611(b) is not
quite as unconstrained as it was under Johnson,51 611(b) cross-
examination remains extremely broad. The scope-of-the-direct
requirement has generally replaced the wide-open rule, but be-
tween the second sentence of Rule 611(b) and courts' willingness
to broadly interpret the scope of the direct, Johnson's influence
persists.
47 FRE 611(b) ("Cross-examination should not go beyond the subject matter of the
direct examination and matters affecting the witness's credibility.") (emphasis added).
48 For a discussion of how cases after Simmons read an impeachment exception in-
to the doctrine, see Part I.B.2.
49 See FRE 404, 608, 609, 613, 801(d)(1) (governing the permissible use of im-
peachment in various circumstances). Several forms of impeachment are not codified in
the FRE, however, such as impeachment by bias, incapacity, or specific contradiction.
Impeachment in the context of Rule 104(d) will be discussed in considerably more detail
in Parts I.B.2, II.C, and II.B.
50 Johnson, 318 US at 195. The Court also addressed the question whether the
prosecutor's use of Johnson's claim of privilege against him in closing arguments was
improper. Id at 196-200. The Court's reasoning on this issue and related notions of
fairness are discussed in Part I.B.1 in the context of Simmons and its underlying poli-
cy rationales.
51 Some state rules of evidence, however, explicitly retain the Johnson relevancy
test. See, for example, Md Rule Evid 5-611(b) (emphasis added):
(1) Except as provided in subsection (b)(2), cross-examination should be limited
to the subject matter of the direct examination and matters affecting the credi-
bility of the witness. . . .
(2) An accused who testifies on a non-preliminary matter may be cross-
examined on any matter relevant to any issue in the action.
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United States v Bozovich52 illustrates just how liberally
courts are willing to interpret the extent of a defendant's direct
examination for purposes of establishing the proper scope of
cross-examination. Mark Bozovich was convicted of conspiracy
to distribute heroin and appealed on the theory that the district
court had erred by allowing the government to cross-examine
him well beyond the scope of his direct testimony.a5 At trial,
Bozovich had testified about his criminal record and heroin ad-
diction.54 The prosecution then cross-examined Bozovich about
who had supplied him and his associates with heroin.5s Holding
that "[t]he standard under Rule 611(b) is whether the cross-
examination was reasonably related to the subject matter of
direct examination,"56 the Seventh Circuit concluded that "[b]y
testifying on direct about his heroin purchasing habits and the
motives for his purchases, Bozovich opened himself up for cross-
examination as to those topics."57 The court noted that "both the
United States Supreme Court and our court have liberally in-
terpreted the extent of the defendant's direct examination for
purposes of establishing the proper scope of the cross-
examination."58 Thus, in this case, the Seventh Circuit found
that it was perfectly reasonable for the district judge to view the
scope of Bozovich's direct examination not as "heroin addiction"
but more broadly as "heroin use," which encompassed infor-
mation about Bozovich's suppliers, purchase quantities, and
ability to pay.59
The "management of cross examination is [thus] peculiarly
committed to the district court's discretion."o Trial judges can
"exercise reasonable control over the mode and order of examin-
ing witnesses and presenting evidence"61 and can interpret di-
rect examination broadly or narrowly for the purpose of
establishing the scope of cross. Furthermore, a deferential
abuse-of-discretion standard of review means trial judges'
Rule 611(b) rulings are rarely reversed on appeal.62 By
52 782 F3d 814 (7th Cir 2015).
53 Id at 815.
54 Id.
55 Id at 816.
56 Bozovich, 782 F3d at 816 (quotation marks omitted).
57 Id at 817 (quotation marks omitted).
58 Id at 816, quoting United States v Harbour, 809 F2d 384, 388-89 (7th Cir 1985).
59 Bozovich, 782 F3d at 817.
60 Id at 816.
61 FRE 611(a).
62 See Bozovich, 782 F3d at 816.
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delegating control over cross-examination to trial judges and
giving them express license to push the bounds of the scope-of-
the-direct requirement, 3 Rule 611(b) codifies the spirit behind
the Johnson relevancy test.
Despite the breadth of permissible cross-examination, the
practice is not entirely without limits. The Supreme Court has
held that "the right to . . . cross-examine is not absolute and
may, in appropriate cases, bow to accommodate other legitimate
interests in the criminal trial process."4 Such constraints have
been narrowly circumscribed, however, as the Court closely ex-
amines any competing interest invoked to limit cross-
examination in order to protect the "integrity of the fact-finding
process."65 The Court recognized this potential limitation on the
right to cross-examination in Chambers v Mississippi,66 despite
the fact that it did not find a sufficient countervailing interest on
the facts before it. In Chambers, the defendant had been denied
the opportunity to cross-examine a key witness on the basis of
Mississippi's voucher rule, which stated that a party may not
impeach his own witness. 67 The voucher rule rests on the pre-
sumption that a party who calls a witness "vouches for his cred-
ibility," without regard to the circumstances of the particular
case.68 Weighing the voucher rule against the defendant's Sixth
Amendment right to confrontation, the Court concluded that the
voucher rule is an outdated vestige of English trial practice that
"bears little present relationship to the realities of the criminal
process" and can be harmful to defendants' efforts to develop a de-
fense.69 Thus, in Chambers, the Court held that the defendant's
right to cross-examination prevailed over competing interests.70
63 See FRE 611, Advisory Committee Note to Subdivision (b) ("We recommend that
the rule allowing questions upon any part of the issue known to the witness . . . be
adopted.").
64 Chambers v Mississippi, 410 US 284, 295 (1973).
65 Id.
66 410 US 284 (1973).
67 Id at 295. Leon Chambers was convicted of murdering a police officer. At his tri-
al, he attempted to show that another man, Gable McDonald, had repeatedly confessed
to the crime, including once in a sworn statement to Chambers's attorney. Chambers
called McDonald at trial but, due to the application of Mississippi's voucher rule, was not
allowed to question McDonald as an adverse witness when McDonald repudiated his con-
fession on the state's cross-examination. Id at 285-91.
68 Id at 295.
69 Id at 296. FRE 607 explicitly rejects the voucher rule. See FRE 607, Advisory
Committee Note ("The traditional rule against impeaching one's own witness is aban-
doned as based on false premises.").
70 Chambers, 410 US at 295-98, 302.
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While the Chambers Court concluded that the voucher rule
did not provide a sufficient countervailing interest to limit cross-
examination, the First Circuit relied on the Court's language to
hold that the right to cross-examination must yield in light of a
state procedural rule whose purpose "is central to the truth-
seeking function of the trial."71 In Cheek v Bates,72 Dorothy
Cheek was convicted of second-degree murder and argued on
appeal that the trial judge's refusal to allow her lawyer to ques-
tion one of the prosecution's chief witnesses to show bias violat-
ed her Sixth Amendment right to confrontation.73 The trial
judge's ruling was made pursuant to a Massachusetts rule that
requires a cross-examining lawyer to make some explanation as
to how he expects to show bias by means of the witness's answer
when the judge is unable to see the relevance or purpose of a
question.74 In this case, Cheek's lawyer violated the rule by fail-
ing to explain the basis for his questions in order to obtain a
more definitive ruling from the court.75 Relying on Chambers,
the First Circuit concluded that the trial judge's ruling denying
cross-examination into the witness's bias was proper, consider-
ing that the "policy of requiring an explanation of an otherwise
ambiguous question is central to the truth-seeking function of
the trial."76
Chambers and Cheek thus suggest that a court may limit
cross-examination when doing so would enhance rather than
undermine the truth-seeking process. This view finds support in
the Advisory Committee Note to Rule 611(b), which says that
the "efforts, delays and misprisions" caused by restrictive rules
of cross-examination are worth the cost when they do not merely
govern the order of evidence but are "the necessary incidents to
the guarding of substantive rights or the fundamentals of fair
trial."77
71 Cheek v Bates, 615 F2d 559, 562-63 (1st Cir 1980).
72 615 F2d 559 (1st Cir 1980).
73 Id at 560.
74 Id at 561-62.
75 Id at 561.
76 Cheek, 615 F2d at 562-63.
77 FRE 611, Advisory Committee Note to Subdivision (b).
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B. The Simmons Doctrine: 104(d)-like Protection for
Constitutional Rights
Simmons was decided in 1968, only seven years before the
FRE were enacted, and Rule 104(d) is sometimes said to embody
the Supreme Court's holding in Simmons.78 While the exact
scope of the holding in Simmons is unclear, its reach is narrower
than that of Rule 104(d). First, Simmons is most commonly in-
terpreted as a special protection that applies only to Fourth
Amendment suppression hearings or perhaps only to constitu-
tional rights more generally.79 Second, Simmons addresses the
question of when a criminal defendant's testimony at a prelimi-
nary hearing can be admitted against him at trial, while
Rule 104(d) governs the scope of cross-examination at the hear-
ing itself.80 Nonetheless, the Simmons doctrine runs parallel to
Rule 104(d), and the two share the same motivating principles,
making Simmons and its progeny highly relevant to interpreting
the scope of Rule 104(d).
1. Limiting subsequent use of preliminary hearing
testimony and mitigating the deterrent effect of
uncertainty on defendants' decision to testify.
In Simmons, defendants Thomas Simmons, William
Andrews, and Robert Garrett were convicted of armed bank rob-
bery.81 Before trial, Garrett moved to suppress a suitcase con-
taining incriminating evidence seized by FBI agents during a
search of Andrews's mother's house, alleging that the suitcase
had been searched and seized in violation of the Fourth
Amendment.82 The agents had no warrant, and at trial, it was
78 See, for example, United States v Roberts, 14 F3d 502, 517 (10th Cir 1993);
United States v Williams, 754 F2d 672, 676 (6th Cir 1985) ("[Simmons] formed the basis
for the subsequently enacted rule, Fed.R. of Evid. 104(d)."). See also FRE 104, Advisory
Committee Note to Subdivision (d) (citing Simmons directly).
79 Compare Ex parte Homan, 963 SW2d 543, 544 (Tex App 1996) ("Simmons dealt
with the Fourth Amendment protection from unreasonable searches and seizures."), with
Nelson v State, 765 SW2d 401, 403 (Tex Crim App 1989) (characterizing Simmons's "lim-
ited purpose" doctrine as providing that "an accused is not required to surrender one
constitutional right in order to gain the benefit of another").
80 See FRE 104, Advisory Committee Note to Subdivision (d) ("The rule does not
address itself to questions of the subsequent use of testimony given by an accused at a
hearing on a preliminary matter."), citing generally Simmons, 390 US 377.
81 Simmons, 390 US at 379-81. The Seventh Circuit affirmed as to Simmons and
Garrett but reversed Andrews's conviction due to insufficient evidence linking him to the
robbery. The Supreme Court granted certiorari as to Simmons and Garrett. Id at 381.
82 Id at 380-81.
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disputed whether Andrews's mother had given them permission
to search the house.83 Because Garrett was not present at the
time the suitcase was seized, in order to establish standing for
his Fourth Amendment suppression motion, he had to testify
that, although he could not identify the suitcase with certainty,
it was similar to one he had owned and he was the owner of
clothing found inside.84 The district court denied Garrett's mo-
tion to suppress, and Garrett's testimony at the hearing that he
was the owner of the suitcase was later admitted against him at
trial.85
The Supreme Court held that Garrett's testimony at the
suppression hearing should not have been admitted against him
at trial on the issue of guilt.86 Because Garrett was forced to
choose between a potentially valid Fourth Amendment claim
and his Fifth Amendment privilege against self-incrimination,
the Court reasoned that while a defendant's testimony should
not be considered "compelled" just because, in refraining from
testifying, he forgoes a benefit, "an undeniable tension is creat-
ed" when the benefit to be gained is that afforded by another
provision of the Bill of Rights. 87 In such circumstances, the Court
"[found] it intolerable that one constitutional right should have
to be surrendered in order to assert another."88 Thus, the
Simmons doctrine protects defendants from having their prelim-
inary hearing testimony used against them at trial whenever
their testimony brings two constitutional rights into conflict.
A driving force behind the Court's holding in Simmons was
the concern that "a defendant who knows that his testimony
may be admissible against him at trial will sometimes be de-
terred from presenting the testimonial proof . .. necessary to as-
sert a . . . claim."89 The harmful effect of such uncertainty was
illustrated in Johnson, when the prosecution used Johnson's
claim of privilege under the Fifth Amendment against him in its
83 Id at 380.
84 Id at 381, 389-91 ("The only, or at least the most natural, way in which [Garrett]
could found standing to object to the admission of the suitcase was to testify that he was
its owner. Thus, his testimony is to be regarded as an integral part of his Fourth
Amendment exclusion claim.").
85 Simmons, 390 US at 381.
86 Id at 393-94.
87 Id.
88 Id at 394.
89 Simmons, 390 US at 392-93 (emphasis added).
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closing argument.90 The Johnson Court emphasized the im-
portance of good-faith preliminary rulings, finding that "[a]n ac-
cused having the assurance of the court that his claim of privi-
lege would be granted might well be entrapped if his assertion of
the privilege could then be used against him."91 A defendant,
knowing that his claim of privilege, though granted, might be
used against him, "well might never claim it."92 By limiting later
use of preliminary hearing testimony, the Simmons Court elim-
inated some of this uncertainty, thus encouraging defendant
participation in preliminary hearings-which dovetails into a
policy goal of Rule 104(d).93
2. Simmons and the Rule 104(d) impeachment exception.
Cases after Simmons read an impeachment exception into
the doctrine, such that Simmons came to stand for the proposi-
tion that "[a] defendant at a suppression hearing may testify
without fear that that testimony will be used against him at tri-
al except for impeachment."94 Even after Simmons, the prosecu-
tion would be able to introduce Garrett's hearing testimony re-
garding his ownership of the suitcase against him at trial if, for
example, he took the stand and denied ever having seen it be-
fore. While an impeachment exception is in line both with the
way impeachment is incorporated into the FRE and with the
impeachment exception to the exclusionary rule,95 it is worth
noting that Simmons itself recognizes no such exception. In fact,
Simmons does not mention the words "impeachment" or "credi-
bility" anywhere in the opinion.96 While some courts have recog-
nized that "Simmons left open the question of whether the
90 See text accompanying notes 38-41. While the Court discussed the issue at some
length, the statements are dicta because the defendant waived any objection to the pros-
ecutor's comment below. See Johnson, 318 US at 200.
91 Johnson, 318 US at 197.
92 Id.
93 See FRE 104, Advisory Committee Note to Subdivision (d).
94 United States v Gomez-Diaz, 712 F2d 949, 951 n 1 (5th Cir 1983) (emphasis add-
ed), citing generally Simmons, 390 US 377. See also Roberts, 14 F3d at 517 ("Rule 104(d)
embodies the Supreme Court's holding in Simmons v. United States permitting a de-
fendant to testify at a suppression hearing without fear his testimony will be used for
other than impeachment purposes at trial.") (emphasis added and citation omitted).
95 See Walder v United States, 347 US 62, 65 (1954) (limiting the exclusionary rule
in the Fourth Amendment context to the government's case in chief, thus allowing intro-
duction of evidence and statements obtained in violation of the Fourth Amendment for
impeachment purposes); Harris v New York, 401 US 222, 225-26 (1971) (limiting the
exclusionary rule in the Miranda context to the same ends).
96 See generally Simmons, 390 US 377.
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government may . .. use a defendant's suppression hearing tes-
timony to impeach him at trial,"97 many courts have proceeded
on the assumption that Simmons provides an impeachment ex-
ception.98 Regardless of whether courts have realized that
Simmons does not provide the concrete support they have as-
cribed to it, this gap in the law has effectively been filled, as
"every Circuit to [address the issue] has allowed impeachment
use of a defendant's suppression hearing testimony."99
The impeachment exception to the Simmons privilege has
thus become part of post-Simmons jurisprudence, and an im-
peachment exception has also been imported into Rule 104(d).
The Senate Judiciary Committee was careful to clarify that
Rule 104(d) "is not [] intended to immunize the accused from
cross-examination where, in testifying about a preliminary is-
sue, he injects other issues into the hearing."100 This language,
combined with the Advisory Committee's citationiol to Walder v
United States,102 which held that a defendant cannot use the
government's inability to cross-examine him as "a shield against
contradiction of his untruths,"103 suggests that the Committee
intended to incorporate an impeachment exception into the
rule.104
Thus, even when Rule 104(d) applies, the prosecution some-
times may cross-examine a defendant beyond the scope of the
preliminary question at issue for the purpose of impeaching his
credibility. This limitation, while sensible in terms of preventing
a defendant from lying on the stand, is also problematic. A de-
fendant's credibility will almost always be at issue in a
97 United States v Mitchell, 2015 WL 5886198, *2 (ED Pa) ("This Court has not de-
cided whether Simmons precludes the use of a defendant's testimony at a suppression
hearing to impeach his testimony at trial."), citing United States v Salvucci, 448 US 83,
93-94 (1980). See also generally Morgan G. Graham, Note, The Use of Suppression Hear-
ing Testimony to Impeach, 59 Ind L J 295 (1984) (discussing the post-Salvucci uncertain-
ty about whether Simmons protection extends to impeachment).
98 See, for example, Gomez-Diaz, 712 F2d at 951 n 1; Roberts, 14 F3d at 517.
99 Mitchell, 2015 WL 5886198 at *2 (collecting cases).
100 S Rep No 93-1277, 93d Cong, 2d Sess 24 (1974), reprinted in 1974 USCCAN
7051, 7070-71.
101 See FRE 104, Advisory Committee Note to Subdivision (d).
102 347 US 62 (1954).
103 Id at 65.
104 The Maryland Rules of Evidence support this conclusion: "An accused who testi-
fies only on a preliminary matter of admissibility can be cross-examined only on that
matter and as to credibility." Md Rule Evid 5-104, Advisory Committee Note to Subdivi-
sion (d) (emphasis added). See also text accompanying note 114 (discussing why the
Maryland Rules can shed light on the FRE).
2032
Cross-Examining the Preliminary Question
preliminary hearing,105 and the purpose of the prosecutor's cross-
examination questions may not always be clear.106 Further,
while in the Simmons context the Court has been explicit that
there is no difference between whether the defendant is im-
peached as to collateral matters or as to matters bearing directly
on the crimes charged,17 the scope of the Rule 104(d) impeach-
ment exception is less clear.10s
II. CONFUSION REGARDING THE SCOPE OF RULE 104(D)
No unified body of case law dealing with Rule 104(d) has
developed. Courts differ in their treatment of the issue, but they
do not fall into any well-defined circuit split. Despite the lack of
uniformity, there are roughly three approaches courts take in
determining the scope of preliminary-hearing cross-examination.
The most protective, pro-defendant reading gives "prelimi-
nary question" its narrowest possible meaning in order to con-
strain the matters on which the defendant is subject to question-
ing on cross. For example, in the context of a Fourth
Amendment suppression hearing, a "preliminary question"
would be each individual legal question that a court must an-
swer in order to determine whether a piece of evidence is admis-
sible-for example, was there a search, was there a warrant, or
did a warrant exception apply? To the extent that the defend-
ant's testimony were cabined to only some of these questions,
cross-examination would also be so limited.
An intermediate approach might define "preliminary ques-
tion" as any claim that on its own is sufficient to affect the ad-
missibility of a particular piece of evidence. Thus, if the defend-
ant were to make three Fourth Amendment claims relating to
the same piece of evidence, each would represent a separate
"preliminary question." If the defendant's testimony were lim-
ited to only one of them, cross-examination would also be so lim-
ited. What these two approaches have in common is that they
both involve intrahearing parsing of the issues. While courts
105 See Roberts, 14 F3d at 517 ("Although Rule 104(d) circumscribes the govern-
ment's cross-examination to the issue of voluntariness, defendant's credibility is inextri-
cably tied to that resolution.").
106 See, for example, United States v Grady, 2005 WL 2739031, *2 (MD NC) (illus-
trating how parties can disagree about whether particular cross-examination questions
are being used substantively or only for impeachment purposes).
107 See Harris, 401 US at 225.
108 The Rule 104(d) impeachment exception will be discussed in more detail in
Part II.C.
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rarely define issues as narrowly as defendants might wish, most
do define preliminary questions more narrowly than the subject
of the entire motion and thus engage in at least some degree of
intrahearing parsing.
Under the least protective approach, the admissibility of a
particular piece of evidence, or even an entire motion to sup-
press, counts as a single "preliminary question." If the defendant
were to testify about any facts relating to the admissibility ques-
tion, he would open the door to cross-examination on any fact
relevant to the admissibility of that piece of evidence. This ap-
plication of Rule 104(d) most closely resembles the traditional
Johnson approach and essentially imports the first sentence of
Rule 611(b) into the preliminary-hearing context such that the
preliminary question and the hearing issue are one and the
same.
This Part discusses a number of federal and state cases that
interpret the scope of "preliminary question." This provides a
framework for drawing the outer limits of Rule 104(d) cross-
examination in light of its stated goals and relationship to
Rule 611(b).
A. Intrahearing Parsing of Preliminary Questions-a
Protective (Defendant-Friendly) Approach
One set of cases illustrates the most protective approach to
Rule 104(d) cross-examination, reading "preliminary question"
as the smallest constituent unit of the hearing issue. For exam-
ple, in Wright v State,109 the Maryland Court of Appeals de-
fined the scope of the hearing as the admissibility of the de-
fendant's confession and limited cross-examination to the
narrower issue of voluntariness. Although Wright was decided
before the enactment of the FRE, its protective interpretation
of "preliminary matter" was later incorporated into Maryland
Rule of Evidence 5-104(d)."o While the Maryland Rules,
adopted in 1993, were modeled on the FRE, the language of
Maryland Rules 5-104(d) and 5-611(b) clarifies the relationship
between the two rules in a way that can shed light on their fed-
eral counterparts. Most notably, the Maryland Rules explicitly
exclude preliminary- question cross-examination from the
109 9 A2d 253 (Md 1939).
110 The Maryland Rule is nearly identical to FRE 104(d): 'The accused does not, by
testifying upon a preliminary matter of admissibility, become subject to cross-
examination as to other issues in the case." Md Rule Evid 5-104(d).
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Johnson relevancy test,' specify that the second provision of
Rule 611(b) does not apply to the preliminary-hearing con-
text,112 and directly incorporate an impeachment exception into
Rule 5-104(d).13
Overall, the Maryland Rules of Evidence reflect a much
greater effort to clearly define the scope of cross-examination,
both generally and in the preliminary-hearing context. Because-
the Maryland Rules were adopted in 1993, these changes may
have been made in response to confusion resulting from the
FRE's formulations, which is especially likely considering that
the Maryland Court of Appeals "did not wish the [Evidence
Rules] Subcommittee simply to propose an uncritical adoption of
the Federal Rules."1" On the one hand, the Maryland Rules thus
can help interpret the FRE, as they reflect how the FRE were
interpreted and their wording ameliorated by a state court. On
the other hand, the FRE have been amended multiple times
since 1994, and Rules 104(d) and 611(b) have remained un-
changed, suggesting that reading the FRE in light of Mary-
land's and other states' revisions should be done with consider-
able caution.
The Maryland Court of Appeals wrestled with these same
issues in Wright more than fifty years prior to the adoption of
the Maryland Rules. In Wright, defendants Howard Wright and
James Watkins were convicted of selling and possessing lottery
tickets in violation of state law.115 After his arrest, Watkins was
locked in a jail cell for twenty hours, denied the privilege of see-
ing his attorney or obtaining bail, and grilled by police until he
111 The Committee note to Rule 5-104(d) directly indicates that it should be read in
conjunction with 5-611(b)(2), which states that "[an accused who testifies on a non-
preliminary matter may be cross-examined on any matter relevant to any issue in the
action." Md Rule Evid 5-611(b) (emphasis added).
112 Md Rule Evid 5-611(b)(1) ("Except for the cross-examination of an accused who
testifies on a preliminary matter, the court may, in the exercise of discretion, permit in-
quiry into additional matters as if on direct examination.") (emphasis added). The em-
phasized language is missing from FRE 611(b), leaving it ambiguous whether it is within
the court's discretion to allow cross-examination as if on direct in the FRE 104(d) con-
text, as well. Thus, the Federal Rule is silent on whether the second sentence of
Rule 611(b) can be imported into the preliminary-hearing context, whereas the Maryland
Rule clearly prohibits it.
113 Md Rule Evid 5-104, Advisory Committee Note to Subdivision (d) ("An accused
who testifies only on a preliminary matter of admissibility can be cross-examined only on
that matter and as to credibility.") (emphasis added).
114 Alan D. Hornstein, The New Maryland Rules of Evidence: Survey, Analysis and
Critique, 54 Md L Rev 1032, 1033 (1995).
115 Wright, 9 A2d at 254.
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confessed to selling slips for a man whose name he did not
know.116 The defense asked the trial court to allow Watkins to
testify for the sole purpose of explaining the circumstances un-
der which his confession was made, but the court ruled that if
Watkins took the stand, even if only for this narrow purpose, he
would nevertheless be subject to cross-examination "as to any
facts pertaining to the charge in the indictment that may be
brought out by his counsel on direct examination."117 The trial
court thus applied the scope-of-the-direct rule in the context of
deciding the preliminary question of the admissibility of
Watkins's confession.
The Maryland Court of Appeals found the trial court's rul-
ing improper, holding that cross-examination beyond the prelim-
inary issue of the voluntariness of Watkins's confession should
not have been permitted:
Inasmuch as the admissibility of a confession is dependent
upon its voluntary character, the question of whether or not
it is voluntary must be decided in the first instance, when
the offer to introduce the testimony is made. The sole ques-
tion to be determined by the trial judge at that time is
whether the confession is admissible because voluntary, or
inadmissible because involuntary.118
The Court of Appeals thus broke down the issue into its compo-
nent parts and-instead of allowing general cross-examination
into any relevant facts or into all factors pertaining to the ad-
missibility of Watkins's confession-limited cross-examination
solely to the issue of voluntariness. It is noteworthy that the tri-
al court had merely said that it would allow cross-examination
relating to other matters brought out on direct, which is normal-
ly permissible under the general cross-examination provision in
the first sentence of Rule 611(b). Yet, in this case, in the context
of a preliminary hearing on the admissibility of a confession, the
Court of Appeals circumscribed the scope of cross-examination
within much narrower limits. Wright thus illustrates a protec-
tive approach to preliminary-hearing cross-examination by re-
jecting the lower court's coterminous interpretation and opting
instead for intrahearing parsing. Although the FRE came later,
considering the Advisory Committee's intention that Rule 104(d)
116 Id at 255-56.
117 Id at 255.
118 Id.
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act as a counterweight to the broad cross-examination allowed
under Rule 611(b),119 the court's treatment of preliminary-
hearing cross-examination in Wright not only provides criminal
defendants with the greatest degree of protection,120 but is also
faithful to the spirit of the Rule.
Like Maryland, Texas has also interpreted "preliminary
question" narrowly. Ex parte Homanl2l provides an even strong-
er example of the defendant-friendly approach to Rule 104(d).
The case concerned defendant Elbert Homan's appeal of an or-
der denying an application for a writ of habeas corpus. Homan
sought a reduction in bail, claiming that the trial court had
erred in overruling his request to testify concerning his ability to
make bail without subjecting himself to cross-examination as to
other issues.122 The Texas Court of Appeals, interpreting Texas
Rule of Criminal Evidence 104(d),123 held that "a defendant may
testify in a bail hearing regarding his ability to make bail with-
out subjecting himself to cross-examination on the nature and
circumstances of the offense with which he is charged."124 The
court thus treated Homan's ability to make bail as a "prelimi-
nary matter" under Rule 104(d). This constitutes a narrow read-
ing, given that under Texas law, the ability to make bail is but
one factor out of five (another of which is the nature and circum-
stances of the offense) to be considered in fixing the amount of
bail.125 Thus, like the court in Wright, the court here broke down
the issue (appropriate amount of bail) into its component parts,
treating each factor as its own preliminary question.
119 See FRE 104, Advisory Committee Note to Subdivision (d).
120 In Wright, the Court of Appeals found Watkins's confession involuntary and re-
versed his conviction. 9 A2d at 256-57.
121 963 SW2d 543 (Tex App 1996).
122 Id at 543.
123 The Texas Rules of Criminal Evidence were the predecessor to the Texas Rules of
Evidence, which were enacted in 1998 and amended in 2015. The version of Texas
Rule 104(d) at issue in Homan stated: "The accused does not, by testifying upon a pre-
liminary matter out of the hearing of the jury, subject himself to cross-examination as to
other issues in the case." Homan, 963 SW2d at 543-44. Today's Tex Rule Evid 104(d)
uses practically the same language: "By testifying outside the jury's hearing on a prelim-
inary question, a defendant in a criminal case does not become subject to cross-
examination on other issues in the case." Both formulations are nearly identical to
FRE 104(d). It is also useful to be aware of Tex Rule Evid 611(b), whose scope is even
broader than its federal counterpart: "A witness may be cross-examined on any relevant
matter, including credibility."
124 Homan, 963 SW2d at 544.
125 See Tex Crim Code 17.15.
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Opting for an intermediate interpretation, the Fifth Circuit
in United States v Gomez-Diaz126 limited Homan's deconstructive
approach, holding that "[t]here is no federal right to limit the
testimony of a witness on a preliminary matter to one single
phase of an issue."127 Gomez-Diaz thus rejects the narrowest pos-
sible interpretation of Rule 104(d), but it does not clearly deline-
ate the outer limit of permissible cross-examination. While the
quoted language could provide textual support for much broader
interpretations of "preliminary question," the case itself strad-
dles a middle ground in its application of Rule 104(d) and, like
Wright and Homan, recognizes that a court may define constitu-
ent preliminary questions within the larger question at issue at
a preliminary hearing.
In Gomez-Diaz, Jamie Alberto Gomez-Diaz was convicted of
importing cocaine and possessing cocaine with intent to distrib-
ute.128 When asked to take an x-ray after being apprehended at
an airport for acting suspiciously, Gomez-Diaz "verbally agreed
to the x-ray procedures, but refused to sign a written consent
form, explaining that he wanted to reserve his right to sue the
government in case he became ill from the examination."129
When Gomez-Diaz was taken to the hospital, he did not resist
and physically cooperated with all procedures, but again refused
to sign a consent form offered by hospital personnel, reiterating
his wish to retain his right to sue the government in case of in-
jury.13 0 Based on the x-ray results, Gomez-Diaz was arrested for
transporting cocaine.131
Before trial, Gomez-Diaz moved to suppress the cocaine, al-
leging that the government had lacked sufficient cause to con-
duct the x-ray.13 2 During the hearing on the motion, a customs
inspector testified that Gomez-Diaz verbally consented to the x-
ray. The defense asked the court to allow Gomez-Diaz to testify
on the limited yes-or-no question whether Gomez-Diaz gave his
consent. However, the court denied the request and explained
that, if Gomez-Diaz took the stand, "the government would be
allowed to cross-examine him about any matters relating to his
alleged consent that occurred during the time he was detained
126 712 F2d 949 (5th Cir 1983).
127 Id at 951.
128 Id at 950.
129 Id.
130 Gomez-Diaz, 712 F2d at 950.
131 Id.
132 Id.
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for examination."aa As a result, Gomez-Diaz decided not to testi-
fy; the motion to suppress was denied, and Gomez-Diaz was
convicted and sentenced to nine years in prison.134
On appeal, the Fifth Circuit addressed the proper scope of
cross-examination at Gomez-Diaz's suppression hearing. Hold-
ing that "[t]here is no federal right to limit the testimony of a wit-
ness on a preliminary matter to one single phase of an issue," the
court found that the preliminary question at issue was "whether
Gomez-Diaz consented to the x-ray," that "the issue of consent
goes beyond a single yes or no answer to the question of whether
he verbally agreed to the x-ray," and that therefore "[t]he magis-
trate correctly interpreted Rule 104(d) to permit full cross-
examination on the 'preliminary matter' of consent if Gomez-Diaz
chose to take the stand."136 Based on the evidence of his oral con-
sent and general cooperation, presented through the inspector's
testimony, the Fifth Circuit concluded that Gomez-Diaz had con-
sented to the x-ray and affirmed his conviction.136
Gomez-Diaz raises several important points in interpreting
Rule 104(d). First, the case puts forth the idea that "preliminary
question" does not have to be interpreted as the smallest con-
stituent unit of the matter at issue, especially when this would
require the court to break down a seemingly self-contained issue
into smaller parts. There is an appealing logic to this reasoning.
For example, in this case, it makes sense to view the issue of
"consent" to encompass not only whether Gomez-Diaz signed a
waiver but also his oral statements and behavior. Further, con-
sent was already a narrow issue at the hearing, considering that
the overall question of the suppression hearing was whether the
x-ray was proper, which included whether the government need-
ed a warrant, whether the government had reasonable suspicion
that Gomez-Diaz had drugs in his body, and whether something
more than reasonable suspicion should have been required.137
Nonetheless (and second), Gomez-Diaz demonstrates that,
while Rule 104(d) runs counter to the intuition that limiting
cross-examination undermines truth-seeking,138 in reality nar-
rowing the scope of preliminary-hearing cross-examination of
133 Id at 950-51.
134 Gomez-Diaz, 712 F2d at 951.
135 Id at 951-52.
136 Id.
137 See id at 951.
138 See text accompanying notes 64-77.
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the defendant frequently will not materially hinder the prosecu-
tion. In Gomez-Diaz, the prosecution had already presented all
its desired evidence through the inspector's testimony. The court
in Homan similarly rejected such a claim of unfair disadvantage,
finding that "[t]he State has ample means with which to present
evidence of the nature of the offense and the circumstances un-
der which it was committed through the testimony of other wit-
nesses and reports."139 This may often be true in the Rule 104(d)
context-that is, even assuming a narrow interpretation of "pre-
liminary question," the prosecution can achieve similar results
through a combination of limited cross-examination of the de-
fendant, impeachment, and extrinsic evidence as it would have
through broader cross-examination of the defendant. Such cir-
cumstances should be weighed in the defendant's favor under
Chambers and Cheek: Rule 104(d)'s protection represents a legit-
imate countervailing interest that outweighs the impact on the
integrity of the fact-finding process from limiting cross when the
evidence can be introduced through other means. 140 After all,
Rule 104(d) aims to provide procedural protection for defend-
ants' substantive rights, and there is even less reason for mini-
mizing the scope of that protection if it does not unfairly disad-
vantage the prosecution or compromise truth seeking. This is
especially true because broad cross-examination tends to deter
defendants from testifying in the first place, which itself under-
cuts the truth-seeking process.141
While Wright, Homan, and Gomez-Diaz present different
approaches to delineating Rule 104(d) cross-examination, they
all recognize that a "preliminary question" is often a constituent
issue within the larger question of the pretrial hearing. As such,
Wright limited cross-examination to the issue of the voluntari-
ness of the defendant's confession, Homan to one of five bail fac-
tors, and Gomez-Diaz to the issue of the defendant's consent to
an x-ray. Thus defining "preliminary question" narrowly limits
the defendant's exposure on cross-examination, decreases the
disincentive for defendants to testify, and rarely puts the
139 Homan, 963 SW2d at 545 (quotation marks omitted).
140 See text accompanying notes 64-77.
141 See text accompanying notes 192-94.
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prosecution at an unfair disadvantage, preserving the truth-
seeking function of the trial process.
B. Importing Rule 611(b) into the Preliminary-Hearing
Context-a Less Protective (Prosecution-Friendly) Approach
The broadest interpretation of "preliminary question" that
Rule 104(d) can reasonably bear is that of the trial court in
Wright14---that is, importing Rule 611(b)'s scope-of-the-direct
requirement into the preliminary-hearing context. 143 This read-
ing of Rule 104(d) is coterminous with the first sentence of
Rule 611(b), allowing cross-examination within the scope of the
direct examination at preliminary hearings as well as at trial.
Allen v United States,144 on the other hand, illustrates a
formulation of Rule 104(d) that goes too far. The Allen court
read "preliminary question" as an entire motion to suppress, 145
in effect importing all of Rule 611(b), including its second sen-
tence allowing inquiry into additional matters, into the
preliminary-hearing context. Defendant Billie Allen was con-
victed of murder in the course of an armed bank robbery and
sentenced to death.146 Allen filed a motion under 28 USC§ 2255,147 asking the court to set aside his death sentence on the
grounds of numerous alleged constitutional violations. Allen
142 See text accompanying notes 117-20.
143 This outer limit is in line with the Maryland Rules of Evidence, which state that,
"[e]xcept for the cross-examination of an accused who testifies on a preliminary matter,
the court may, in the exercise of discretion, permit inquiry into additional matters as if
on direct examination." Md Rule Evid 5-611(b)(1) (emphasis added). This implies that, in
the case of preliminary-question cross-examination, the court may not permit inquiry
into additional matters as if on direct.
144 2011 WL 1770929 (ED Mo).
145 Id at *6.
146 Id at *1.
147 The motion to vacate, set aside, or correct a sentence-provided by 28 USC§ 2255-is a modern descendant of the petition for a writ of habeas corpus and is availa-
ble to defendants convicted in the federal courts who are "in custody." Section 2255 is the
primary avenue to postconviction relief for federal prisoners. See Brandon L. Garrett and
Lee Kovarsky, Federal Habeas Corpus: Executive Detention and Post-conviction Litiga-
tion 417 (Foundation 2013) ("Virtually all of the post-conviction practice for federal pris-
oners involves § 2255 motions, and not habeas corpus motions under § 2241."). See also
Emily Tancer Broach, Comment, Post-conviction Proceedings, Supervised Release, and a
Prudential Approach to the Mootness Doctrine, 2010 U Chi Legal F 493, 494 n 3, 497-98
(2010); Terrell J. Iandiorio, Comment, Federal Postconviction Relief and 28 USC
§ 2255(4): Are State Court Decisions 'Facts"?, 71 U Chi L Rev 1141, 1141-42 (2004). A
broader range of claims-such as sentencing challenges-are cognizable under § 2255, as
compared to the analog for those in state detention (§ 2254). See Garrett and Kovarsky,
Federal Habeas Corpus at 418-20 (cited in note 147).
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included a claim for ineffective assistance of counsel due to his
trial lawyer's failure to effectively argue for suppression of his
post-arrest statements to law enforcement in which he acknowl-
edged having participated in the robbery and murder.148 At the
suppression hearing, the magistrate judge had said that, if Allen
took the witness stand, "he's there for whatever cross examina-
tion that may pop up."149 The judge had then asked Allen's law-
yer whether there was any law that suggested otherwise, and
Allen's lawyer failed to present arguments under Rule 104(d)
and Simmons.150 Based on this exchange with the judge, Allen
decided not to testify at the hearing.151
The court concluded that Allen's trial counsel did not pro-
vide ineffective assistance in failing to offer Rule 104(d) and
Simmons arguments in connection with Allen's motion to sup-
press,15 2 finding no Rule 104(d) violation because "[t]he magis-
trate judge did not suggest that Allen would be subject to cross-
examination on anything other than the 'preliminary matter' of
issues relevant to his motion to suppress."153 What is key here is
that the court held that cross-examination on the "'preliminary
matter' of issues relevant to [Allen's] motion to suppress" "might
necessarily go beyond only those matters raised by counsel on
direct examination."154 Thus, without any mention of impeach-
ment, the court endorsed the idea that cross-examination under
Rule 104(d) can actually exceed the scope of cross-examination
permitted under the first sentence of Rule 611(b). Given that
Rule 104(d) cross-examination is meant to be narrower than
that under Rule 611(b)155 and that Rule 611(b) cross-
examination is governed by the scope-of-the-direct requirement
in the first sentence of that Rule,156 that Allen allows Rule 104(d)
cross to exceed the scope of the direct examination turns
148 Allen, 2011 WL 1770929 at *3-4.
149 Id at *4.
150 Id at *4-6.
151 Id at *5.
152 Allen, 2011 WL 1770929 at *7.
153 Id at *6. The court also found Simmons inapplicable because Allen's motion did
not concern the admissibility of his hearing testimony later at trial, but only the proper
scope of cross-examination at the hearing itself, which is governed by Rule 104(d), not
Simmons. See id.
154 Id.
155 See FRE 104, Advisory Committee Note to Subdivision (d) ("[Rule 104(d)] is nec-
essary because of the breadth of cross-examination under Rule 611(b).").
156 See FRE 611, Advisory Committee Note to Subdivision (b). See also text accom-
panying note 19.
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Rules 104(d) and 611(b) on their heads. It is so broad as to un-
dermine Rule 104(d)'s intended application as described by the
Advisory Committee.
Allen thus helps draw the line past which a broad interpre-
tation of Rule 104(d) goes too far: cross-examination under
Rule 104(d) should not exceed the scope of what would be per-
mitted under the first sentence of Rule 611(b). In other words,
cross-examination of a criminal defendant at a preliminary
hearing cannot exceed the scope of the direct (as liberally con-
strued under Bozovich),157 other than perhaps for the limited
purpose of impeaching the defendant's credibility.
C. Uncertainty regarding the Scope of the Rule 104(d)
Impeachment Exception
The impeachment exception to Rule 104(d), while universal-
ly accepted, has never been properly defined. The scope of this
exception is extremely important, however, as an overbroad ex-
ception can undermine even a narrow interpretation of
Rule 104(d) cross-examination by permitting questioning far be-
yond the scope of the preliminary matter on credibility grounds.
The Senate report accompanying the FRE's enactment provides
some guidance:
[Rule 104(d)] is not, however, intended to immunize the ac-
cused from cross-examination where, in testifying about a
preliminary issue, he injects other issues into the hearing. If
he could not be cross-examined about any issues gratuitous-
ly raised by him beyond the scope of the preliminary mat-
ters, injustice might result. Accordingly, in order to prevent
any such unjust result, the committee intends the rule to be
construed to provide that the accused may subject himself to
cross-examination as to issues raised by his own testimony
upon a preliminary matter before a jury.158
While the Senate report reaffirms the existence of an impeach-
ment exception to Rule 104(d) and lays out the reasons for its
importance, it leaves several questions unanswered. First, does
the exception apply only to defendant testimony on a prelimi-
nary matter before a jury or to testimony on a preliminary mat-
ter more generally? While the quoted language clearly suggests
157 See text accompanying notes 51-63.
158 S Rep No 93-1277 at 24 (cited in note 100).
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the former, this would seem to be an unduly narrow reading,
given that Rule 104(d) usually applies at pretrial hearings out-
side the presence of a jury. Second, while the Senate report per-
mits extrahearing cross-examination when the defendant him-
self raises issues outside the scope of the preliminary question
on direct, it is silent on whether the prosecution may engage in
such cross-examination to impeach the defendant's credibility
when the defendant has not injected extraneous issues into the
hearing. This was the situation in United States v Roberts.159
Roberts illustrates one approach to the Rule 104(d) im-
peachment exception in cases in which the defendant is not re-
sponsible for introducing new issues into the hearing. Under
this approach, the impeachment goes not only to the defendant's
credibility, but is also constrained within the underlying sub-
stantive scope of the preliminary question at issue. In Roberts,
the Tenth Circuit held that cross-examination regarding the de-
fendant's mental capacity to run a business while under the in-
fluence of methamphetamine was proper on the issue of the vol-
untariness of his confession.160 Defendant Lee Roberts was
convicted of conspiracy to possess with intent to distribute
methamphetamine.161 Roberts filed a pretrial motion to suppress
a confession he had given to a law enforcement agent while he
was incarcerated.162 At the suppression hearing, Roberts testi-
fied that, when the agent took his statement, he was under the
influence of methamphetamine, which he asserted "gives the
user a false sense of security."163 He further testified that "he
was not read his Miranda rights; he was handcuffed; and offic-
ers held a gun to his head."164 On cross-examination, the prose-
cution challenged each of these statements and attempted to
impeach Roberts's credibility by demonstrating that he was, in
fact, "rational and functioning properly" at the time.1es To make
this showing, the prosecution questioned Roberts about his
ability to run a business, direct sales, and collect money while
high on methamphetamine.166 The lower court allowed the
questioning, reasoning that "because the hearing measured
159 14 F3d 502 (10th Cir 1993).
160 Id at 517.
161 Id at 509.
162 Id at 508, 516.
163 Roberts, 14 F3d at 516-17.
164 Id at 517.
165 Id.
166 Id.
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the sole issue of voluntariness, defendant could not pick and
choose what evidence manifested his mental state at the time
of his confession."167
While the Tenth Circuit acknowledged the protective rules
of Simmons and 104(d), it emphasized that these protections
give way to the ultimate goal of promoting the defendant's obli-
gation to testify truthfully.168 The court further held that, while
the "preliminary question" at the suppression hearing was the
voluntariness of Roberts's confession, "defendant's credibility is
inextricably tied to that resolution."169 In support of this point,
the court approvingly cited170 United States v Williams,171 in
which the Sixth Circuit held that the prosecution's questioning
regarding whether Gregory Williams knew he was carrying
drugs was proper given that Williams had previously placed his
credibility in issue by denying he had been nervous at the time
of his apprehension.172 Finally, citing Gomez-Diaz, the court con-
cluded that, "once [the] defendant takes the stand on this pre-
liminary matter, Rule 104(d) does not permit him to define the
question of voluntariness."173 Thus, the court held that the trial
court had not erred in permitting the prosecutor to question
Roberts about his awareness and mental capacity to run a busi-
ness during the time he had maintained he was substantially
under the influence of drugs.174
In this case, Roberts's direct testimony was within the scope
of the preliminary question of voluntariness, thus not triggering
the full extrahearing cross-examination that the Senate report
reserved for circumstances in which the defendant injects extra-
neous issues into the hearing on direct. And while the prosecu-
tion's cross-examination about Roberts's business might appear
to be beyond the scope of the preliminary question or even the
scope of the direct, the questioning actually goes directly to the
167 Roberts, 14 F3d at 517.
168 Id ("[T]he Court has persisted in reading the [Simmons] rule to promote the de-
fendant's obligation to testify truthfully, at the expense of policies designed to inhibit the
violation of constitutional rights.") (quotation marks omitted). This view is in line with
Chambers, which holds that cross-examination can give way only to legitimate compet-
ing interests when the truth-seeking process is not thereby undermined. Chambers, 410
US at 295. See also text accompanying notes 64-65.
169 Roberts, 14 F3d at 517.
170 See id.
171 754 F2d 672 (6th Cir 1985).
172 Id at 676.
173 Roberts, 14 F3d at 517, citing Gomez-Diaz, 712 F2d at 951.
174 Roberts, 14 F3d at 517.
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issue of the voluntariness of his confession. Because Roberts ar-
gued that his confession was partially involuntary due to the
fact that he was in an impaired state, it was highly relevant that
Roberts was able to run a business and make rational business
decisions while under the influence of meth, suggesting that he
was also capable of giving a voluntary confession under the
same conditions. Thus, the prosecution's impeachment of
Roberts's credibility did not go beyond the preliminary question
of voluntariness.
Whereas in Roberts the prosecution's impeachment was rel-
evant both to credibility and to the underlying preliminary ques-
tion, in other cases impeachment cross-examination may exceed
the scope of the preliminary hearing. For example, if on direct
Roberts had claimed that he had never owned a motorcycle-
even though two of the times he was caught with meth he was
riding a motorcycle175-the prosecution may have tried to im-
peach him with extrinsic evidence of his motorcycle use. How-
ever, this kind of cross-examination would have been beyond the
scope of the preliminary question of the voluntariness of
Roberts's confession, and its permissibility under Rule 104(d) is
therefore uncertain. While in the Simmons context the Court
has explicitly said that there is no difference between whether a
defendant is impeached as to collateral matters or matters bear-
ing directly on the crimes charged,176 in the Rule 104(d) context,
neither the FRE nor the Court has delimited the scope of the
impeachment exception beyond the narrow circumstance ad-
dressed in the Senate report. Part III.B argues that Rule 104(d)
impeachment cross-examination should be bifurcated: when the
defendant injects "other issues" beyond the scope of the prelimi-
nary question on direct, he exposes himself to impeachment
questioning beyond the scope of the preliminary question on
cross; on the other hand, when the defendant does not raise ex-
traneous issues, the prosecution must limit itself to impeach-
ment cross-examination that does not exceed the bounds of the
preliminary question. Thus, in the motorcycle example given
above, the critical question for defining the scope of permissible
impeachment cross-examination would be whether Roberts's
statement that he had never owned a motorcycle counted as an
extraneous issue. This approach balances Rule 104(d) protection
175 Id at 508.
176 See Harris v New York, 401 US 222, 225 (1971).
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for defendants, which can be undermined by broad impeach-
ment, against truth seeking and the need to deter misleading
and perjurious testimony.
III. PROPOSED SOLUTIONS TO A PROBLEM OF DISCRETION
This Comment proposes a solution to tackle the three pri-
mary factors responsible for disincentivizing criminal defend-
ants from testifying at pretrial hearings: (1) the problem of over-
ly broad cross-examination due to broad interpretations of
"preliminary question," (2) the problem of using impeachment to
justify cross-examination beyond the scope of the preliminary is-
sue, and (3) the problem of uncertainty. To respond to these con-
cerns, this Comment first argues for drawing a strict outer limit
to the scope of cross-examination under Rule 104(d): cross-
examination under Rule 104(d) must not exceed what would be
permissible under the general provision of Rule 611(b). Second,
the impeachment exception to Rule 104(d) should be limited to
attacks on the defendant's credibility that are also relevant to
the preliminary question at issue in the hearing. And third, this
Comment encourages trial judges to make preliminary rulings
on the scope of permissible cross-examination before the defend-
ant decides whether or not to testify.
A. Defining the Bounds of Permissible Cross-Examination
under Rule 104(d)
As discussed in the preceding sections, the extent of
Rule 104(d)'s protection is not at all clear, and courts have di-
verged in their treatment of preliminary-hearing cross-
examination. The Advisory Committee Notes help in linking
Rule 104(d) to Rule 611(b), but the nature of this relationship is
also ambiguous. For example, does Rule 104(d) merely override
the second sentence of Rule 611(b)? Or does it provide a narrow-
er scope than even Rule 611(b)'s general provision? The rule
must be read in light of the overarching guiding principle pro-
vided by the Advisory Committee Notes: "to encourage partici-
pation by the accused in the determination of preliminary
matters."177
177 FRE 104, Advisory Committee Note to Subdivision (d).
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1. Rule 611(b) as the outer limit to Rule 104(d) cross-
examination.
Reading Rule 104(d) in the context of Rule 104 as a whole
supports the parsing approach of Wright, Homan, and Gomez-
Diaz. Rule 104(a) states that "[t]he court must decide any pre-
liminary question about whether a witness is qualified, a privi-
lege exists, or evidence is admissible."178 Using the admissibility
of evidence as an example, the language of Rule 104(a) can be
interpreted in one of two ways: (1) it could mean that "whether
. . . evidence is admissible" is a preliminary question or (2) it
could mean that "any preliminary question about whether ...
evidence is admissible" is a preliminary question, implying that
there can be multiple preliminary questions involved in deciding
the admissibility of a particular piece of evidence. The latter
view finds support in the Advisory Committee Note to
Rule 104(a). The note states that the admissibility of evidence
will often turn on the existence of a particular factual condition,
such as whether an expert is a qualified physician or whether a
witness whose former testimony is being offered is unavaila-
ble.179 The existence of the condition is thus a constituent prelim-
inary question within the broader preliminary question of the
admissibility of the evidence. For example, if a hearsay state-
ment is offered as a declaration against interest, the judge must
first decide whether the statement meets the requirements for
such statements under Rule 804(b)(3). In this case, each re-
quirement would be a separate preliminary question-was the
witness unavailable as required by Rule 804(a), was the state-
ment against interest, and so on. Thus, the Advisory Committee
Note to Rule 104(a) suggests that "preliminary question" should
be interpreted more narrowly than simply whether evidence is
admissible. This entails intrahearing parsing as discussed in
Part II.A.
Rule 104(b) supports this narrow interpretation. The rule
states that "[w]hen the relevance of evidence depends on wheth-
er a fact exists, proof must be introduced sufficient to support a
finding that the fact does exist."180 The Advisory Committee Note
to Rule 104(b) illustrates how this works and emphasizes the
different levels of generality encompassed within the meaning of
178 FRE 104(a).
179 FRE 104, Advisory Committee Note to Subdivision (a).
180 FRE 104(b).
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"preliminary question": "In some situations, the relevancy of an
item of evidence, in the large sense, depends upon the existence
of a particular preliminary fact."181 Whether the fact exists is
thus a constituent preliminary question in deciding the broader
preliminary question whether the evidence is relevant. For ex-
ample, "when a spoken statement is relied upon to prove notice
to X, it is without probative value unless X heard it."182 In this
scenario, the fact (whether X heard the statement) is a constitu-
ent preliminary question that must be proven before the larger
preliminary question (whether X had notice) can be decided. Be-
cause Rules 104(a) and 104(b) contemplate multiple levels of
generality in which constituent preliminary questions have to be
decided before larger ones, they support the deconstructive read-
ing of Rule 104(d) adopted by Wright, Homan, and Gomez-Diaz.
Rule 104 is inconsistent, however, with the broad interpretation
of the court in Allen.
A potential problem with trying to define "preliminary ques-
tion" more clearly, however, is the fact that the drafters of the
FRE may have intentionally left Rule 104(d) open ended.188 This
is reflected in the Advisory Committee Note to Rule 611(b),
which lays out the policy reasons for the Committee's preference
for "wide-open" cross-examination limited only by trial-judge
discretion:
[T]he wide-open rule presents little or no opportunity for
dispute in its application. The restrictive practice in all its
forms, on the other hand, is productive in many court
rooms, of continual bickering over the choice of the numer-
ous variations of the "scope of the direct" criterion, and of
their application to particular cross-questions. . . . If these
efforts, delays and misprisions were the necessary incidents
to the guarding of substantive rights or the fundamentals of
fair trial, they might be worth the cost. As the price of the
choice of an obviously debatable regulation of the order of
evidence, the sacrifice seems misguided.184
181 FRE 104, Advisory Committee Note to Subdivision (b) (emphasis added).
182 FRE 104, Advisory Committee Note to Subdivision (b).
183 See FRE 104, Advisory Committee Note to Subdivision (a) ("[T]his subdivision
refers to preliminary requirements generally by the broad term 'questions,' without at-
tempt at specification.").
184 FRE 611, Advisory Committee Note to Subdivision (b).
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This efficiency argument for a Johnson-like relevancy test,1 85
combined with the fact that management of cross-examination is
meant to be left to trial judges' discretion,186 raises the concern
that implementing a narrower approach to defining cross-
examination might be contrary to the Rules' approach of leaving
such matters to the discretion of the trial court.
This argument in favor of "wide-open" cross-examination
does not apply to the Rule 104(d) context, however. Critically,
the above-quoted language is found in support of Rule 611(b) ra-
ther than Rule 104(d). The Advisory Committee acknowledges
this important difference when it says that the costs of restric-
tive cross-examination rules are too steep a price to pay simply
for the regulation of the order of evidence. On the other hand,
the Committee says the costs might be worth it if substantive
rights were at stake. Given that Rule 104(d) aims to protect the
substantive rights of criminal defendants at preliminary hear-
ings, which often concern constitutional rights, the efficiency ar-
gument advanced in favor of wide-open cross-examination under
Rule 611(b) cannot be imported into the Rule 104(d) context.1 87
This is particularly true given the undeniable tension between
broad trial-court discretion and the purpose of Rule 104(d) to
''encourage participation by the accused in the determination of
preliminary matters,"18 which is hindered by uncertainty.189
The relationship between Rules 104(d) and 611(b) and the
Senate Judiciary Committee's impeachment exception suggests
limits for 104(d) cross-examination. First, Rule 104(d) is meant
to counterbalance the breadth of Rule 611(b). Further, cross-
examination under Rule 611(b) is generally governed by the
scope-of-the-direct requirement in the first sentence of that
rule.190 Thus, Rule 104(d) cross-examination must not exceed the
scope of the direct-unless, that is, cross-examination falls with-
in the narrow impeachment exception described by the Senate
Judiciary Committee in its report accompanying the enactment
185 See notes 42-50 and accompanying text.
186 See FRE 104(a), 611(a); Bozovich, 782 F3d at 816. See also text accompanying
notes 60-63.
187 This conclusion comports with Maryland Rule of Evidence 5-611(b)(2), which
states that "[a]n accused who testifies on a non-preliminary matter may be cross-
examined on any matter relevant to any issue in the action" (emphasis added), implying
that the relevancy test does not apply to testimony on preliminary matters.
188 FRE 104, Advisory Committee Note to Subdivision (d).
189 See text accompanying notes 89-92.
190 See text accompanying note 19.
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of the FRE.191 This outer limit to Rule 104(d) cross-examination
recognizes that any interpretation of "preliminary question" as
broad as that in Allen is contrary to the text and spirit of
Rule 104(d).
2. The Chambers floor to Rule 104(d) cross-examination-
preserving the "integrity of the fact-finding process."
Chambers and Cheek recognize that the right to cross-
examination must yield to other legitimate interests in the crim-
inal trial process when limiting cross-examination will preserve
the "integrity of the fact-finding process."192 In light of the im-
portant substantive rights at stake during preliminary hearings
and the overarching policy interest in encouraging defendant
participation, Rule 104(d) will often provide a countervailing
interest that is sufficient to justify limiting the scope of cross-
examination. This is especially true given that defendant par-
ticipation enhances the truth-seeking process, as the defendant
himself is often the person who "above all others may be in a po-
sition to meet the prosecution's case."193 This is because
"[c]riminal defendants themselves are often a critical source of
information about what happened," and, in cases with no wit-
nesses, "the defendant is often one of the only good sources of in-
formation."194 Thus, defendant testimony "help[s] to reduce both
false negatives and false positives."195
Nonetheless, the Chambers floor remains a meaningful re-
straint on narrowing preliminary-hearing cross-examination. If
carried to its logical extreme, Rule 104(d) could be used to elimi-
nate preliminary-hearing cross-examination altogether.196 Re-
quiring that the integrity of the fact-finding process be
191 See S Rep No 93-1277 at 24 (cited in note 100).
192 Chambers, 410 US at 295; Cheek, 615 F2d at 562-63.
193 Ferguson v Georgia, 365 US 570, 582 (1961).
194 Sampsell-Jones, 93 Minn L Rev at 1332 (cited in note 9).
195 Id. False positives occur when an innocent person is found guilty and false nega-
tives when a guilty person is set free. Id at 1330.
196 See Sampsell-Jones, 93 Minn L Rev at 1328 (cited in note 9):
In the interest of eliminating the cost [to defendant testimony], we could re-
form evidence law to prohibit prosecutorial cross-examination of criminal de-
fendants. But such a reform would be senseless. Even if it would promote "neu-
trality" by unburdening the right to testify, it would be anomalous in evidence
law, and it would impede the truth-seeking function of trial.
See also text accompanying notes 22-25, 64-77 (discussing the value of cross-
examination as a truth-seeking tool).
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preserved keeps the final judgment call in the hands of the trial
judge. For example, in Gomez-Diaz, the court found that cross-
examination must be broad enough to cover the entire issue of
consent to the x-ray, not merely the yes-or-no question whether
the defendant signed a waiver.197 By trying to limit the scope of
cross merely to whether he had signed a waiver when the rest of
his behavior clearly indicated consent, Gomez-Diaz was attempt-
ing to skew his testimony in a manner not conducive to the
truth-seeking process. Even though the prosecution was able to
introduce the evidence by other means and so was not unduly
disadvantaged in this case, the trial judge-and the Fifth
Circuit when affirming-held that Rule 104(d) should not permit
this kind of strategic manipulation. Thus, the court retained
some flexibility for trial judges in defining the scope of cross by
refusing to require that a defendant's testimony on a prelimi-
nary matter be limited to "one single phase of an issue."198 This
view is supported by the Advisory Committee's citation of
Walder,199 which held that a defendant cannot use the govern-
ment's inability to cross-examine him as "a shield against con-
tradiction of his untruths,"200 and is the same concern that moti-
vates the impeachment exception to Rule 104(d). Chambers and
Cheek thus set an inner limit to Rule 104(d): cross-examination
may be limited when important substantive rights are at stake
as long as the truth-seeking function of the trial process is not
thereby undermined. This permits trial judges to engage in in-
trahearing parsing while also preserving the flexibility to safe-
guard against attempts that so narrowly define the preliminary
question as to make cross-examination meaningless.
Constrained within the limits represented by Chambers and
Allen, trial judges would retain significant discretion in deciding
the scope of cross-examination, allowing anything as narrow as
197 Gomez-Diaz, 712 F2d at 951-52. See also text accompanying notes 132-36.
198 Gomez-Diaz, 712 F2d at 951. The Second Circuit similarly allowed broader cross-
examination in United States v Jaswal, 47 F3d 539 (2d Cir 1995) (per curiam), in which
a defendant's direct examination went far beyond his original claim that he had not been
properly advised of his Miranda rights and essentially accused the agents of fabricating
his confession and procuring his signature by false promises. Id at 543. In this context,
the court concluded that it was proper for the government to cross-examine the defend-
ant to rebut his contentions. Id at 543.
199 See FRE 104, Advisory Committee Note to Subdivision (d).
200 Walder, 347 US at 65.
[84:20172052
Cross-Examining the Preliminary Question
treating each individual legal issue as a preliminary question
(for example, whether a witness is unavailable for the purpose of
a Rule 804 hearsay exception) and anything as broad as a par-
ticular claim (for example, whether a hearsay statement is ad-
missible under an exception). Judges would also play a key role
in accounting for other factors, such as whether broader cross-
examination should be allowed for purposes of impeachment,
whether a defendant seems to be trying to artificially define
"preliminary question" so narrowly as to manipulate the evi-
dence and undermine the truth-seeking process, and the extent
to which the prosecution will be harmed by limited cross-
examination. The range provided by Chambers and Allen thus
simply acts to guide trial-court discretion, harmonize
Rule 104(d) interpretation with the text and purpose of the rule,
and eliminate some disincentive for defendants to testify.
B. Constraining the Scope of the Impeachment Exception
Given the sometimes-conflicting interests of protecting
defendants and safeguarding the truth-seeking function of cross-
examination, an interpretation of Rule 104(d) would be incom-
plete without considering the scope of its impeachment excep-
tion. Failing to recognize an impeachment exception would un-
derdeter defendants from lying on the stand, whereas overly
broad impeachment would undermine a narrow reading of "pre-
liminary question," making the outer limits described in
Part III.A ineffectual. This Comment thus proposes a middle-
ground approach to the Rule 104(d) impeachment exception:
when the prosecution seeks to impeach a defendant's credibility
and the defendant has not injected issues beyond the scope of
the preliminary question on direct, impeachment cross-
examination also must not exceed the scope of the preliminary
question. It is important to recall that the text of Rule 104(d) it-
self says nothing about impeachment; rather, the exception has
been read in over time due to the background principle that a
defendant should not be shielded against contradiction of his un-
truths.201 Despite the innate notion that impeachment preserves
an element of fairness in criminal trials, there is a competing
background principle that dictates that impeachment be limited
when it conflicts with countervailing policy interests. In the con-
text of a preliminary hearing, encouraging defendant
201 See id.
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participation in the determination of preliminary matters is the
policy goal that animates Rule 104(d). It is therefore necessary
to read in both background principles to prevent the impeach-
ment exception from swallowing the rule.
Other rules limit impeachment in certain circumstances.
For example, Rule 408 prohibits introducing evidence of com-
promise offers to prove or disprove the validity or amount of a
disputed claim. Such evidence may not be offered to impeach a
witness by prior inconsistent statement or contradiction.202 Simi-
larly, Rule 411, which prohibits evidence of liability insurance to
prove wrongdoing, also allows only impeachment for bias.
203 In
both cases, the FRE limit impeachment in order to promote
countervailing policy interests-"the public policy favoring the
compromise and settlement of disputes"24 in the case of
Rule 408 and the desire to prevent juries from deciding cases on
improper grounds in Rule 411.205 In such cases, "the trial court
must balance the policy ... with the need for evaluating the
credibility of the witnesses."206
Sometimes, a court may judge the policy interest so strong
as to be reluctant to allow any impeachment at all. For example,
in the context of settlement negotiations, the Tenth Circuit has
found that "[t]he risks of prejudice and confusion entailed in re-
ceiving settlement evidence are such that often . . . the underly-
ing policy of Rule 408 require[s] exclusion even when a permis-
sible purpose can be discerned."207 This view is reflected in
Rule 410, which excludes all evidence of criminal plea negotia-
tions, including for impeachment purposes, in order to encour-
age plea bargaining.208 Rules 408, 410, and 411 thus reflect the
view that, while some impeachment may be necessary to pre-
serve the integrity of the truth-seeking process, 209 impeachment
202 FRE 408.
203 FRE 411.
204 FRE 408, Advisory Committee Note. See also Ramada Development Co v Rauch,
644 F2d 1097, 1106 (5th Cir 1981) ("This rule is designed to encourage settlements by
fostering free and full discussion of the issues.").
205 FRE 411, Advisory Committee Note.
206 Reichenbach v Smith, 528 F2d 1072, 1075 (5th Cir 1976) (applying Rule 408 to
prohibit impeachment cross-examination of the plaintiff about a settlement agreement).
207 Equal Employment Opportunity Commission v Gear Petroleum, Inc, 948 F2d
1542, 1545-46 (10th Cir 1991).
208 See FRE 410, Advisory Committee Note. See also United States v Lawson, 683
F2d 688, 692-93 (2d Cir 1982) (describing how the legislative history of Rule 410 explic-
itly precluded use of statements made in plea negotiations for impeachment purposes).
209 See Part III.A.2 (discussing Chambers).
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can and should be limited when it would otherwise undermine
the policy interests that motivate the rule.210
Thus, the fact that Rule 104(d) contains an impeachment
exception says little about its intended scope. The Senate report
accompanying the rule's enactment 211 provides some guidance,
but as discussed in Part II.C, the report addresses only the nar-
row situation in which a defendant injects extraneous issues in-
to the hearing on direct. The report is silent on the scope of per-
missible cross-examination to impeach a defendant's credibility
when the defendant is not responsible for introducing new issues
into the hearing.212 Thus, in the latter context, there is room for
a more limited impeachment exception, and an impeachment
exception that is restricted to the scope of the preliminary ques-
tion at issue-that is, when the questioning is relevant both to
credibility and the underlying substantive question, as was the
case in Roberts-is the most faithful to the text and purpose of
Rule 104(d). After all, the language of the rule explicitly states
that a testifying defendant must "not become subject to cross-
examination on other issues in the case." Given the rule's pur-
pose to protect defendants and encourage their full participation
at preliminary hearings, a limited impeachment exception is
both consistent with case law and faithful to the text and pur-
pose of Rule 104(d). Further, because this limited exception does
not disturb the broader exception reserved for cases in which a
defendant "gratuitously" raises "other issues . . . beyond the
scope of the preliminary matters," the injustice the Senate
Judiciary Committee feared is not implicated.213
C. Preliminary Rulings as an Extra Procedural Protection
Even after constraining preliminary-hearing cross-
examination within the bounds established by Allen and
Chambers and limiting impeachment to the scope of the prelimi-
nary question, trial judges will retain significant discretion. Thus,
210 Impeachment use of substantively inadmissible evidence can also be completely
forbidden. For example, while the exclusionary rule permits impeachment use of evi-
dence and statements obtained in violation of the Fourth Amendment or Miranda, use of
confessions excluded as involuntary is never allowed. See Walder, 347 US at 65; Harris v
New York, 401 US 222, 225-26 (1971); Jackson v Denno, 378 US 368, 385-86 (1964).
211 S Rep No 93-1277 at 24 (cited in note 100). See also text accompanying note 159.
212 See text accompanying notes 158-59. For an example of a situation in which the
defendant injects extraneous issues into the hearing on direct, see text accompanying
notes 175-76.
213 S Rep No 93-1277 at 24 (cited in note 100). See also text accompanying note 159.
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some uncertainty will continue to deter defendant participa-
tion. Preliminary rulings could be one response to this linger-
ing uncertainty. Encouraging defendants to request and judges
to make good-faith preliminary rulings can mitigate the con-
cern raised in Simmons that a defendant who knows his testi-
mony may be used against him will sometimes be deterred
from testifying at all.
The necessary framework for Rule 104(d) preliminary rul-
ings is already in place. Rule 104(a) requires judges to make pre-
liminary rulings as to preliminary questions like privilege and
admissibility, and Rule 104(c) requires judges to conduct a sepa-
rate hearing if a criminal defendant will testify as a witness and
so requests. Further, motions in limine and preliminary rulings
are common practice in modern litigation.214 For example, a
Florida district court has said that it "welcomes requests for pre-
liminary rulings," finding that they "help clarify the issues for
trial," "allow the parties to prepare knowing what evidence will
be presented," and "avoid[ ] resolving disputes later on the jury's
time."215 The Supreme Court itself has sanctioned the practice,
noting that, "[a]lthough the Federal Rules of Evidence do not
explicitly authorize in limine rulings, the practice has developed
pursuant to the district court's inherent authority to manage the
course of trials."216 The Advisory Committee Notes accompany-
ing the 2000 amendment to Rule 103, which the Court cites di-
rectly in support of its proposition, clearly acknowledge the
prevalence of such in limine rulings.217
Not only are motions in limine common practice, but several
courts have already successfully employed them in the
Rule 104(d) context. For example, in Gomez-Diaz and Allen, the
judges told the parties before the defendants' testimony that
they would allow broad cross-examination. The defendants were
then able to make informed decisions about whether to testify-
214 See generally Randy Wilson, From My Side of the Bench: Motions in Limine, 59
Advocate 74 (Summer 2012) (describing young lawyers' kitchen-sink approach to motions
in limine). See also generally David Paul Horowitz, In the Beginning ... Motions in
Limine, 77 NY St Bar J 16 (May 2005) (discussing the strategic advantages of motions in
limine over traditional objections).
215 Petty v Black, 2014 WL 11511673, *1 (ND Fla), citing FRE 104(a) and Luce v
United States, 469 US 38, 41 n 4 (1984).
216 Luce, 469 US at 41 n 4, citing FRE 103(c).
217 See FRE 103, Advisory Committee Note to 2000 Amendment ("The amendment
applies to all rulings on evidence whether they occur at or before trial, including so-
called 'in limine' rulings.").
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in both cases, they decided not to.218 As these cases demonstrate,
preliminary rulings do not resolve the Allen problem or the dis-
incentive effect of an unfavorable ruling. Further, in limine rul-
ings are merely "preliminary" and "advisory in nature"219 and as
such are not binding on the trial judge. Nonetheless, as long as
preliminary rulings are made in good faith and observed to the
extent possible, as required by the Court in Johnson, they can
mitigate the effect of uncertainty and reduce the likelihood of
the unfair outcome of a defendant being surprised after he has
already testified.
CONCLUSION
Rule 104(d) has the potential to provide a valuable
procedural protection for defendants seeking to assert important
substantive, and often constitutional, rights. However, the FRE
do not define the scope of the rule, and some courts have inter-
preted it in such a way as to minimize its protective force and
thus discourage defendants from testifying. This is a result con-
trary to the stated purpose of the rule and its historical devel-
opment. By examining Rule 104(d) in the context of
Rules 104(a), 104(b), and 611(b), and the accompanying Advisory
Committee Notes, it is possible to discern a view of "preliminary
question" that encompasses different levels of generality, in
which constituent preliminary questions must be decided before
broader ones. The Rules are therefore consistent with a narrow,
intrahearing reading of "preliminary question," as illustrated by
the approaches of Wright, Homan, and Gomez-Diaz. On the oth-
er hand, the Rules do not support a reading as broad as that in
Allen, in which "preliminary question" was interpreted so as to
allow cross-examination even broader than that permitted under
the first sentence of Rule 611(b).
To promote the purpose of the rule to encourage defendants
to testify at pretrial hearings, this Comment has proposed that
cross-examination at such hearings must never be broader than
the scope of the direct. Further, to counteract the possibility of
using impeachment as a back door for impermissibly broadening
the scope of Rule 104(d) cross-examination, this Comment has
suggested that the impeachment exception be limited to credibil-
ity impeachment that is substantively relevant to the
218 See Gomez-Diaz, 712 F2d at 950-51; Allen, 2011 WL 1770929 at *4-6.
219 Horowitz, 77 NY St Bar J at 16 (cited in note 214).
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preliminary question at issue. Finally, due to the deterrent ef-
fect of uncertainty, the Comment has also argued in favor of in-
creased use of preliminary rulings in order to protect defendants
from the disincentivizing-and arguably unfair--effects of un-
certainty and surprise. These changes would increase protection
for defendants, encourage defendant participation in prelimi-
nary hearings, and preserve the structure of the current system
of evidence and the role of trial court discretion, while striving to
interpret the scope of preliminary-question cross-examination in
a way that is faithful to the text and spirit of Rule 104(d) and to
the truth-seeking function of the trial process more generally.
